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The Widow's Election Viewed in the
Light of the 1976 Tax Reform Act and
the 1975 California Probate Code Revision
By CAROL L. WILSON*
The forced widow's election is an estate planning tool that has
been used until recently with varying degrees of success.' This article
proposes to examine the tax and nontax consequences of the election
in the light of the 1976 Tax Reform Act and the 1975 revision of the
California Probate Code. It will be shown that the forced widow's
election is not a viable estate planning device. An effective alternative
plan will be suggested that takes advantage of the provisions of the 1976
Tax Reform Act by utilizing the $3,000 annual exclusion and the
grandchild exception to the taxation of generation-skipping transfers.
Purpose of Forced Widow's Election
In a typical widow's election, the decedent offers to leave his prop-
erty in Trust B, income to the widow for life and remainder to the chil-
dren, in exchange for the widow's transfer of her property to Trust A,
income to the widow for life and remainder to the children. The trus-
tee of Trust A is given the power to invade the corpus of Trust A for
the benefit of the widow, subject to an ascertainable standard. In the
event that Trust A is consumed, the trustee of Trust B may invade prin-
cipal for the benefit of the widow, subject to an ascertainable standard.
In the event that the widow does not elect to take in accordance with
her husband's will, she is not given any of the Trust B property. The
effect of this will provision is to put the widow to a "forced election."
The exchange is structured as a bargain-sale rather than as a bequest
so that the consideration received can be deducted from the widow's
* A.B., 1964, Vassar College; M.A., 1968, Columbia University; J.D., 1976,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Associate with Hanson, Bridgett,
Marcus, Milne & Vlahos. Member, California Bar. Member, San Francisco Bar Asso-
ciation, Probate & Trust Division.
1. The Alection is equally applicable to widowers, but for the purposes of this
discussion the wife shall be deemed the survivor.
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estate on her eventual demise. There are other tax consequences the
discussion of which constitute the body of this article; but before turning
to them, it should be noted that placing the widow's property in trust
affords some nontax benefits as well: (1) The elderly widow or the
widow inexperienced in business matters is relieved from the burden
of managing her property; (2) the testator is freed from the worry that
a subsequent marriage or new objects of the widow's bounty will change
the dissemination of their wealth; (3) the testator's and widow's funds
are professionally managed; (4) unified management of both halves
of the property is provided, which is particularly desirable when the
property involved is not readily divisible (such as business properties);
(5) the widow has increased financial security as a result of receiving
income from all the property; (6) the widow's assets that are placed
in Trust A are removed from her probate estate.
Gift Tax Consequences
When the widow transfers property to Trust A, she retains a life
estate but transfers the remainder interest in that property. The re-
mainder is, therefore, potentially a gift. However, if the transaction
has been structured as a bargain-sale, the widow has received considera-
tion for the transfer of the remainder (i.e., the life estate in Trust B
that was "sold" to the widow under the terms of her husband's will. For
example, the widow transfers $500,000 to Trust A which provides for
income to the widow for life (valued at $200,000) and remainder to
the children (valued at $300,000). The husband's estate transfers
$500,000 to Trust B which provides for income to the widow for life(valued at $200,000), and remainder to the children valued at $300,
000). This example, which will be used throughout the paper, can be
diagrammed as follows:
Figure A
$500,000 $200,000 $300,000
W - Trust A: W for life -- Children
$500,000 $200,000 $300,000
H's estate - Trust B: W for life - Children
Since the widow has given $300,000 to the remainderman but has re-
ceived only $200,000 for the transfer, there is a net taxable gift by the
widow to the remainderman of $100,000.2 It should be noted that the
2. See Kassoy, The Widow's Election: Adverse Tax Consequences Suggest
Avoiding Until New Law Section 1001(e) Clarified, 2 ESTATE PLANNING 108 (1975);
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remainder is a gift of a future interest and therefore does not qualify
for the $3,000 annual exclusion afforded under Internal Revenue Code
section 2503(b).
There are several ways to reduce the impact of the gift tax that
would be assessed under these circumstances. First, the widow can re-
tain a general power of appointment over the remainder interest of
Trust A or can make Trust A revocable. Under these circumstances,
since the gift is not complete because the widow can change the bene-
ficiaries, no gift is assessable. The effect of preventing a completed
transfer of the remainder is to destroy the bargain-sale element of the
widow's election; the widow has not given anything in exchange for the
life estate in Trust B. Since the purpose of the widow's election is to
gain the tax advantages of a bargained-for exchange, this is not a de-
sirable means of reducing the widow's gift taxes.
Second, the husband can increase the value of the life estate in
Trust B that is sold to the widow so that it equals the value of the re-
mainder interest transferred by the widow to Trust A. Since in our
example the remainder interest was $300,000, the life estate the widow
receives in Trust B must be increased in value to $300,000 to avoid
the imposition of a gift tax on the widow.
Third, prior to the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the widow had the
option of using part of her $30,000 lifetime exemption to reduce the
amount of taxable gift in the example described in Figure A. The
1976 Tax Reform Act has eliminated the $30,000 lifetime exemption
and has replaced it with a unified credit, which, when completely
phased in by 1981, will equal $47,000.1 The credit is applied to the
tax due, rather than used to decrease the amount of the gift. The
credit will be phased over five years and is equivalent to the following
exemptions:
Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
50 (1966). The cases have phrased the calculation in a slightly different manner, stating
that the widow's gift is measured by her half'of the community property transferred to
Trust A less the life estate she has retained in Trust A less the life estate she has
received from Trust B. This achieves the same result as calculated above: $500,000-
$200,000-$200,000=$100,000 taxable gift. See Estate of Daisy F. Christ, 54 T.C. 493
(1970), aff'd on other grounds, 480 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Past, 347
F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957); Kuhn v. United
States, 392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Zillah Mae Turman, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961).
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2505. The credit is termed unified because it is
applied to both gift and estate taxes. To the extent the credit is used in payment of gift
taxes, it is unavailable for payment of estate taxes.
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Credit Equivalent exemption
1977 $30,000 $120,667
1978 34,000 134,000
1979 38,000 147,333
1980 42,500 161,563
1981 47,000 175,625
The wording of section 2505 has raised the question of whether
the new credit is an elective one, for the section states "there shall be
allowed as a credit against the tax imposed" (emphasis added). It is
hoped that the question will be answered when the Treasury Depart-
ment issues regulations for section 2505.
Thus, under the 1976 Tax Reform Act, the widow will not have
a taxable gift because the tax on $100,000 ($23,800)1 is reduced to
zero by the available credit. The estate planner can combine plans two
and three above. Under the old law, gift tax could be avoided so long
as the Trust A remainder did not exceed the Trust B life estate by more
than $30,000. Under the new law, gift tax can be avoided (after
1981) so long as the Trust A remainder does not exceed the Trust B
life estate by more than $175,625.
The superiority of the forced widow's election as a tool for avoid-
ing gift taxes can best be appreciated by comparing it with the "volun-
tary" widow's election. In the latter case, there is no element of bar-
gain-sale so that the gift of the remainder interest in Trust A is undi-
minished by the life estate received in Trust B. Thus, in the Figure
A hypothetical, a voluntary widow's election results in a taxable gift of
the Trust A $300,000 remainder and a gift tax of $40,000 ($87,800
tax5 less $47,000 credit). On the other hand, the forced widow's elec-
tion results in a taxable gift of only $100,000 because the $300,000
remainder is decreased by the $200,000 consideration received. No
gift tax is due because the unified credit is applied to the tax. In both
examples, however, the estate tax on the widow's subsequent death is
increased to the extent the unified credit has been used.
Income Tax Consequences to the Widow
Amortization of the Purchase Price
It is now established that the widow is the purchaser of a life
estate in the property her husband has transferred to Trust B.6 The
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2502.
5. Id.
6. See Estate of Christ v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Gist v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); Vardell's Estate v. Comm'r, 307 F.2d 688 (5th
[Vol. 28
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purchase price is the fair market value of the remainder interest in the
property that the widow transfers to Trust A. 7 As a purchaser, the
widow is entitled to amortize the purchase price over her life expec-
tancy and to deduct the purchase price from the income she receives
from her Trust B life estate.8
Commissioner v. Fry' and Bell v. Harrison0 involved a remainder-
man's purchase of an intervening life estate. It was held that the pur-
chaser could amortize the purchase price over the life expectancy of
the seller. Subsequently, the holdings in Gist v. United States," Kuhn
v. United States,12 and Estate of Daisy F. Christ13 permitted a widow,
put to a forced election, to amortize the purchase price over her life
expectancy. Amortization of a life estate is permitted by Internal
Revenue Code section 167(h) unless it is acquired by devise, bequest,
or inheritance within the purview of Internal Revenue Code section
273. Kuhn exhaustively treats the interaction of these two sections and
concludes that the better result is to permit amortization:
In a situation involving the widow's election where the tax-
payer exchanges the remainder interest in her community property
for a life estate in her husband's community property, what actu-
ally occurs can be characterized as part gratuitous disposition-part
sale or exchange . . . where the wife transfers property worth
more than the value of that which she receives, she purchases
property equivalent to the value of the "received" property and
is deemed to have made a gift to the beneficiaries of the estate of,
and should pay a gift tax on, the excess ...
The widow may therefore amortize the income received from
her husband's segment of the life estate.14
In the Figure A example, a 74 year old widow purchases a life
estate for $300,000. She has a life expectancy of eleven years and
therefore may deduct $27,273 ($300,000 --- 11) from her income from
Trust B for the next eleven years.
Cir. 1962); Whiteley v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1963); Estate of
Lillian B. Gregory, 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
7. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
8. Estate of Christ v. Comm'r, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Gist v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970); Comm'r v. Fry, 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960),
aff'g 31 T.C. 522 (1958); Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954); Kuhn v.
United States, 392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
9. 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1960), affg 31 T.C. 522 (1958).
10. 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
11. 423 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1970).
12. 392 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
13. 54 T.C. 493 (1970), affd on other grounds, 480 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
14. 392 F. Supp. 1229, 1239-40 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
July 1977] THE WIDOW'S ELECTION 1439
In his dissenting opinion in Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner,',
Judge Wisdom voices his opposition to allowing amortization of the pur-
chase price against the income from the life estate, stating that it puts
the widow in "taxpayer's utopia."'1  He reasons that the widow de-
creases her income taxes by amortizing the purchase price at the same
time she decreases the amount of corpus to be included in her estate
(since this is a transfer for consideration). What Judge Wisdom fails
to note is that the widow has paid a gift tax on $100,000 and that the
widow's estate is augmented by the distributions from Trust B, and if
she lives out her appointed life span, she will have received an addi-
tional $200,000 of income to be included in her estate. Since the
widow used a capital asset (the remainder) to purchase the Trust B
life estate, it is entirely reasonable to allow her to recover her invest-
ment without taxing it as income.
Gain on Sale of the Remainder Interest
Since the remainder interest sold by the widow in the example
illustrated by Figure A is greater than the life estate received, the
widow does not realize any gain. The widow stands to realize income
if the value of the life estate received is in excess of the remainder in-
terest sold. Since the widow's assets placed in Trust A are generally
capital assets, she will realize income in the form of a capital gain to
the extent the life interest in Trust B exceeds her basis of the remainder
interest in Trust A. This gain may be significant if highly appreciated
property is transferred to Trust A. The widow's share of community
property is treated as if it were acquired from the decedent 17 and in the
past has enjoyed a stepped-up basis on death, the new basis being the
fair market value of the asset at the time of death."5  The advantage in
transferring community property (the stepped-up basis decreasing the
potential capital gain) to Trust A has been nearly eliminated by the
amendment of section 1023 by the 1976 Tax Reform Act. Section
1023 now provides for a carryover basis of property acquired from a
decedent with no stepped-up basis (with some minor adjustments) if the
decedent died after December 31, 1976.1'
When there is a gain, it can be argued that none should be realized
because the life estate in Trust B has been acquired by bequest.2 0
15. 307 F.2d 688, 694-700 (5th Cir. 1962).
16. Id. at 699.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014(b)(6).
18. Id. at § 1014(a).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1023. There are four adjustment calculations, a
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.
20. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
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However, this negates the sought-after concession that the acquisition
of this life estate is the result of a bargained-for exchange.21  It has
also been suggested that the nature of community property may be such
that it could be treated as a property held for productive use or invest-
ment and that the exchange of a remainder interest in Trust A for a
life estate in Trust B is a like-kind exchange within the meaning of
Internal Revenue Code section 1031, thereby allowing nonrecognition
of the gain.22  Section 1.103 1 (a)-1 (c) (2)21 of the Income Tax Regu-
lations authorizes the exchange of a fee for a leasehold with thirty
or more years to run, thereby indicating that if the widow is thought
to exchange her fee interest for a thirty year life estate in both Trust A
and Trust B, the nonrecognition principle of section 1031 may be
applicable.
Income Tax Consequences to the Seller
of the Trust B Life Estate
Who Is the Seller?
It has been suggested that the deceased husband's estate will have
income on the sale of the life estate to the widow.24 This assumes that
it is the executor who makes the sale. However, a more searching
analysis indicates that the decedent's form of- disposition controls
whether the executor (before distribution) or the trustee (after distri-
bution) makes the sale.2 5
The identity of the seller is important in determining on whose
shoulders the ultimate tax burden will rest. When the trustee makes
the sale, the tax will be paid from the trust corpus; when the executor
makes the sale, the residuary legatee's inheritance will be decreased.
What Is the Basis of the Trust B Life Estate?
The determination of the basis of the Trust B life estate has been
one of the most troublesome problems of the widow's election. Until
21. Miller & Martin, Voluntary Widow's Election: Nation-Wide Planning for the
Million Dollar Estate, 1 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 63, 76-77 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Miller & Martin].
22. Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1269,
1282 n.50 (1958).
23. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-I (c) (2) (1976).
24. Freeland, Lind & Stephens, What are the Income Tax Effects of an Estate's
Sale of a Life Interest?, 34 J. TAxATION 376 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Freeland, Lind
& Stephens].
25. Lane, The Widow's Election as a Private Annuity: Boon or Bane for Estate
Planners?, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 74, 86-87 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lane].
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the Technical Changes Act of 1969, the seller of the Trust B life estate
would realize income to the extent that the fair market value of the
remainder interest received exceeded the fair market value of the life
estate sold. The Trust B life estate was valued at fair market value
because it received a stepped-up basis on the decedent's death under
Internal Revenue Code section 1014. Thus, in the Figure A hypo-
thetical, the seller of the Trust B life estate realized income in the form
of a $100,000 capital gain. This was a long term capital gain because
all property acquired from a decedent was deemed to have been held
for more than six months.26
The problem that arose in 1969 resulted from the passage of
Internal Revenue Code section 1001(e), which allocated a zero basis
to term interests acquired from a decedent if the adjusted basis was
determined pursuant to section 1014. The effect of section 1001(e)
was to allocate a zero basis to the life estate in Trust B, thereby produc-
ing a gain in our Figure A example of $300,000.
The 1976 Tax Reform Act has amended section 1014 by adding
section 1014(d) which states: "In the case of a decedent dying after
December 31, 1976, this section shall not apply to any property for
which a carryover basis is provided by section 1023. , 27
The 1976 Tax Reform Act provides a carryover basis for most
properties acquired from a decedent, with the notable exceptions of
section 2042 life insurance and section 72 annuities. "8 Since the basis
of the life estate to be sold to the widow is now determined in accord-
ance with section 1023, not section 1014(b), section 1001(e)'s attribu-
tion of a zero basis to the life estate will not apply. However, since
the basis of the life estate is not stepped up to its fair market value
on death, there still may be significant gain to the seller of the life
estate.
Does the Seller Realize an Ordinary or Capital Gain?
The sale of a life estate has been treated as a sale of a capital
asset for federal income tax purposes.29  In McAllister v. Commis-
26. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1223(11). The 1976 Tax Reform Act has
changed the holding period required for long term capital gain treatment from six
months to one year on a phased-in basis.
27. A carryover basis is defined by section 1023(a) (1) to be the decedent's basis
in the property immediately before his death. This basis is carried over to the person
acquiring the property from the decedent.
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1023(b)(2), (3). These sections of the 1976
amendments list the properties not treated as carryover basis properties.
29. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
(Vol. 28
sioner,3 0 a life estate was sold to the remainderman. In holding that
this was a sale of a capital asset, the court emphasized that the sale
of a life estate was the transfer of a substantial and durable property
interest rather than the temporary transfer of income payments. The
sale of a life estate by one who only owns a life estate is distinguishable
from a trustee's sale of a life estate which is "carved out" of a fee inter-
est. McAllister is not authority for capital gain treatment in the latter
situation. Capital gain treatment, however, has been permitted in a
"carved out" situation in Estate of Johnson N. Camden31 and Eileen
M. Hunter. "3 2  In Camden, a wife sold a life estate to her husband, re-
taining the remainder. She was permitted to treat the transaction as
a sale of a capital asset. In Hunter, a remainder interest in a ranch
was sold, while the life estate was retained. Again, capital gain treat-
ment was accorded the transaction.
The distinction between sale of an entire interest and sale of a
carved out interest is noted by the commissioner, who acquiesced to
capital gain treatment of the former33 but refused to acquiesce to capi-
tal gain treatment of the latter. In Revenue Ruling 72-601 , 4 ordinary
.income treatment was given to a son's sale of a carved out life estate,
on the grounds that the sale was "nothing more than the right to use
his real property for a period of years." 5
A careful analysis of the cases shows that the crucial factor in de-
termining the character of the gain realized in the sale of a property
interest is the type of interest sold and the terms of its sale. Whether
the taxpayer sells his entire interest 6 or carves out an interest, retaining
a reversion or life estate, "7 he will still realize a capital gain if the inter-
est sold is "substantial and durable" and if the payment is for a sum
certain.
In Commissioner v. P. G. Lake,38 the taxpayer was held to have
828 (1947); McAllister v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
30. 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
31. 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
32. 44 T.C. 109 (1965).
33. Rev. Rul. 72-243, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 233.
34. Rev. Rul. 72-601, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 467.
35. Id. at 468; cf. Comm'r v. Gillete Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
36. Allen v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
828 (1947); McAllister v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 530 U.S.
826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Comm'r, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
37. Camden v. Comm'r, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.
1943).
38. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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ordinary income from the sale of a three years' interest in mineral royal-
ties, the taxpayer retaining a reversion. This case has been cited for
the proposition that the sale of a carved out interest produces ordinary
income to the seller. Lake is not authority for this proposition because
a life estate is a durable, substantial, and hence capital asset whereas
a three-year term is not.
In May T. Hrobon,"9 a taxpayer was found to have realized
ordinary income from the sale of her life estate even though the life
estate was all she owned. The sale was structured so that the buyer
would pay 60 percent of the income the buyer received each year from
the trust. This arrangement enabled the buyer to realize a 40 percent
profit without any risk to himself. In denying capital gain treatment
to the seller, the court stressed that the distinguishing feature of the
case was that the payments were tied to the yearly receipt of income
by the buyer rather than to a fixed lump sum price.
The above cases lead to the conclusion that when any life estate
is sold for a sum certain (the buyer taking the risk that the life estate
will yield less than the consideration paid) there is a sale of a capital
asset. Thus, the sale of a life estate to the widow should produce a
gain to the seller which will be a capital gain because the interest sold
is durable and substantial and the consideration paid (the remainder)
is a sum certain.
The writers are not in agreement as to whether ordinary income
or capital gain treatment is to be accorded the gain on the trustee's sale
of a life estate to the widow. Andrews gives great weight to Revenue
Ruling 72-6014o and suggests that the Internal Revenue Service will
treat the gain as ordinary income.4" Brawerman states that either capi-
tal gain or ordinary income treatment is possible, depending on whether
the transaction is cast as a sale of an existing life estate (capital gain)
or as a sale of a life estate that has been carved out of a fee (ordinary
income).42 Professors Freeland, Lind, and Stephens conclude that the
seller will have ordinary income or capital gain depending on whether
the estate is treated as selling the right to the income or the entire term
interest, respectively.43
39. 41 T.C. 476 (1964).
40. 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 467.
41. Andrews, Disposition of a Life Estate in Realty: What are the Implications of
Rev. Rul. 72-601?, 40 J. TAXATION 26, 27 (1974).
42. Brawerman, Disposition of Community Property: Should One Spouse Receive
a Life Estate in Other's Half?, 40 J. TAXATION 116 (1974).
43. See Freeland, Lind & Stephens, supra note 24. The sale of the right to income
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It appears that no one is certain how the gain will be characterized
on sale of a life estate to the widow. The resolution of this problem
became critical with the passage of Internal Revenue Code section
1001(e), and remains critical now that the life estate receives a carry-
over basis that may be substantially less than the fair market value.
How Can the Seller's Gain Be Decreased?
To reduce the impact of the tax on the sale of a life estate,
Professor Lane suggests a "deferred recognition analysis.""'  First, the
husband's will must be structured so that the trustee and not the estate
is the seller of the life estate. 45 Second, the trust is treated as obtain-
ing a future interest in the widow's property and as paying for that inter-
est over the widow's lifetime. Lane argues that Trust B is acquiring
a future interest little by little, thereby eliminating the necessity of tak-
ing the full value of the remainder interest into income in the year of
the transfer. Lane suggests that the amount of income that the trust
should be required to report each year should equal the amortization
deduction the widow is allowed. An adoption of this analysis has the
beneficial effect of spreading the trust's gain over the widow's lifetime.
Lane does not indicate what is to be done if the widow dies at
a time other than her actuarially determined date. If she dies prema-
turely, should the gain that is not yet reported be taken into the trust's
income as in an annuity situation? If the widow lives beyond her com-
puted life span, is the trust entitled to a capital loss for the excess in-
come paid out? There is the additional problem that if the trust is
treated as paying for the remainder interest over the widow's lifetime,
then the trust may not be treated as making a lump sum payment. A
lump sum payment, according to May T. Hrobon,"6 is necessary in order
for the seller to have a capital gain. Thus, although the gain may,
under Lane's analysis, be spread over the widow's lifetime, it will prob-
ably be taxed as ordinary income.47
Who Pays the Tax on Income Earned by Trust A
During Administration?
If the widow transfers her property to Trust A, it is possible that
the income earned by that property will be taxed to the decedent's es-
is an assignment of income for consideration and hence the consideration received should
be treated as ordinary income.
44. Lane, supra note 25, at 102-18.
45. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
46. 41 T.C. 476 (1964).
47. See note 43 supra.
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tate, on the theory that the estate has purchased this property from the
widow. To prevent such taxation, it may be necessary for the widow
to retain the right to revoke the election until the end of the period
of administration's Wells Fargo Bank v. United States49 supports this
solution: splitting of income by the widow and the estate was permitted
where the widow retained the right to withdraw her property from
Trust A.
Estate Tax Consequences to the Widow
The main tax benefit of the widow's election reputedly occurs at
the time of the widow's subsequent death. Her estate includes Trust
A at the time of death (because she retained an income interest in the
corpus)50 less the consideration she received for the transfer to Trust
A." 1 It is not clear, however, whether, in reference to the example
in Figure A, the widow has transferred the $300,000 remainder inter-
est or the $500,000 fee. Nor is it clear whether the widow has re-
ceived consideration of $200,000 (the Trust B life estate) or $400,000
(the Trust A plus Trust B life estates). The resolutions of these prob-
lems are critical but far from certain.
What Has the Widow Transferred to Trust A?
The courts have consistently treated the widow as transferring her
entire fee interest ($500,000) in the property. 52 In United States v.
Past,", it was held that despite the widow's retention of the right to in-
come from property she transferred to a trust, she transferred the whole
property. The court in United States v. Gordon 4 held that the widow
48. Wren, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 34 RoCKY MT. L. REV. 281,
289 (1962); Miller & Martin, supra note 21, at 74.
49. 245 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1957).
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a)(1).
51. Id. at § 2043. Section 2036 (a) (1) was enacted to prevent the avoidance of
estate tax by the device of gratuitously transferring property to another while retaining
an income interest. Since the donor's income interest would not be includable in his
gross estate (it terminates on the donor's death), there would be no inclusion in the gross
estate at all. However, to the extent that consideration was received for the transfer,
the estate will not be diminished. Therefore, a credit for the consideration received is
authorized by section 2043.
52. See United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); United States v. Gordon,
406 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Righter, 400 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965); Vardell's Estate v. Comm'r, 307
F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
53. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
54. 406 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1969).
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transferred all her community property proceeds of life insurance to a
trust even though she retained a life estate in that trust. United States
v. Righter5" involved the transfer of stock to a trust, the transferor re-
taining a life estate in the trust. Here the court assumed that the
amount transferred was the whole property, thereby indicating how
firmly this proposition is now entrenched in judicial thinking.
Not all writers are in accord with this judicial conclusion. A strong
argument has been made that the widow has retained the life interest
and has transferred only the remainder interest in Trust A. 511 Miller
and Martin express dismay at the dicta in Estate of Lillian B. Gregory5"
that the whole of the widow's property was transferred rather than the
remainder interest. 58 They suggest that such treatment goes against
the intent of Internal Revenue Code section 2036 to prevent depletion
of the estate without full and adequate consideration because it be-
comes impossible for the widow to receive full and adequate considera-
tion for her transfer in any arms length transaction. The following
example will illustrate the problem:
Figure B
$500,000 $250,000 $250,000
W - > Trust A: W for life - Children
$500,000 $250,000 $250,000
H's Estate ) Trust B: W for life - Children
In Figure B, the widow has sold a remainder worth $250,000 for
a life estate in Trust B worth $250,000. There is no gift by the widow
and no gain to the widow or to the estate. However, on the widow's
death, she will be treated as having made a transfer of $500,000 (the
fee of Trust A) for a consideration of $250,000 (life estate of Trust
B), thereby causing a $250,000 inclusion in her gross estate under sec-
tion 2036(a)(1). To prevent such inclusion, the estate would have
to sell the widow a life estate worth $500,000 in exchange for a re-
mainder of $250,000.
What Is the Consideration that the Widow Has Received?
The courts have held that the consideration received for the
widow's transfer of her fee interest to Trust A is a life estate in Trust
55. 400 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1968).
56. United States v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 15 (9th Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion);
Miller & Martin, supra note 15, at 63; Brown & Brown, The Widow's Election, 43 CAL.
ST. B.J. 343 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Brown & Brown].
57. 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
58. Miller & Martin, supra note 21, at 72.
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B.19 The reason why the life estate in Trust A cannot also serve as
consideration for the transfer of the widow's property to Trust A was well
expressed in Estate of Lillian B. Gregory:
Section 2036 explicitly prohibits a retained life estate in one's
own property from serving as consideration for estate tax purposes,
since the transferor has retained the benefit of the property, and
is in effect only transferring same on death."
Thus, in the Figure A hypothetical, the widow has transferred
$500,000 and received $200,000 in consideration for the transfer,
thereby drawing $300,000 into her gross estate on her subsequent
death.
There is a basic injustice in treating the consideration received by
the widow as a life estate in Trust B when she is also treated as trans-
ferring all of her property to Trust A pursuant to the forced election.
She should be treated either as giving the life estate away (and getting
it back as consideration for her transfer of the fee interest) or as re-
taining the life estate (and therefore transferring only the remainder
interest). This injustice is pointed out by Professor Morrison, who
states that the theory underlying the full and adequate consideration
test of section 2036 is that there will be no change in the net wealth
of an estate if there has been full consideration for the transfer.6'
A court, applying the reasoning of Past12 to the example illustrated in
Figure B, would hold that the widow had not received full and ade-
quate consideration for her transfer of property to Trust A and would
pull $250,000 into her estate. But, suggests Professor Morrison, the
widow has received $500,000 of income (representing the life estates
in Trusts A and B) which is included in her estate under section 2033.63
Leon and Lawrence Brown are in agreement with Professor
Morrison, stating:
The Past formula may not be "double taxation" in the sense of
including in the widow's gross estate both the entire value of the
property transferred and the consideration received, but it certainly
is punitive taxation, never contemplated by Congress.6 4
59. United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Past, 347 F.2d 7, 13 (9th Cir. 1965); Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d
688, 690 (5th Cir. 1962).
60. 39 T.C. 1012, 1020 (1963).
61. Morrison, The Widow's Election: The Issue of Consideration, 44 TEX. L.
REv. 223, 236 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Morrison].
62. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
63. Morrison, supra note 61.
64. Brown & Brown, supra note 56, at 355-56.
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The logic of Professors Morrison, Brown, and Brown seems unassail-
able.
How Is the Consideration Valued?
The inequity of the court's treatment of the consideration received
by the widow is heightened when the property transferred to Trust A
has appreciated. The following example will illustrate the problem:
Figure C
$500,000
(at W's death: $750,000) $250,000 $250,000
W - ) Trust A: W for life - Children
$500,000 $250,000 $250,000
H's Estate - Trust B: W for life - Children
There are three ways of evaluating the consideration received by the
widow-the frozen dollar approach, the money actually received ap-
proach, and the proportionate approach.
The frozen dollar approach: This is. the evaluation method used
in United States v. Past,65 Estate of Gregory,66 and Vardell's Estate v.
Commissioner.6 7  The consideration received is valued at the date of
transfer to Trust B, so that irrespective of subsequent events, the con-
sideration received by the widow's estate is frozen at $250,000. Thus,
in the Figure C example, the widow's estate would be increased by the
$250,000 appreciation in the Trust A property.
Money actually received approach: Nourse v. Riddel 68 is the
only case in which the court looked to the Trust B monies actually re-
ceived by the widow. The court stressed that actuarial tables do not
supply the authoritative answer and that where the widow lived thirteen
years instead of seven, she received full consideration for the transfer.
Thus, in the above example, if the widow received $400,000 from
Trust B, there would be $350,000 included in her gross estate
($750,000 - $400,000).
The proportionate approach: This method of evaluating the con-
sideration received was first expounded by Judge Learned Hand in
Helvering v. United States Trust Co.69 In that case, a testator had set
65. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
66. 39 T.C. 1012 (1963).
67. 307 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1962).
68. 143 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
69. 111 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1940).
July 1977]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
up a trust partly in consideration for his wife's agreement to support
their child. The court excluded from the testator's gross estate the pro-
portion of the trust that represented the value of the child's support.
Thus, in the Figure C example, $375,000 would be excluded from the
widow's gross estate:
$250,000 (consideration received) X $750,000 (value
$500,000 (property transferred to Trust A of Trust A on death)
The proportionate method was espoused by Judge Ely in his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Past.70 Stating that the frozen
dollar approach has "been justly criticized as leading to extremely harsh
and unjust results either to the Government or to the taxpayer when
there has been substantial depreciation or appreciation in value as of
the date of death,"' 7 1 Judge Ely suggests that the proportionate ap-
proach is fairer to all the parties. Professors Freeland, Lind, and
Stephens72 and Professors Lowndes 71 and Morrison 74 are in agreement
with Judges Ely and Learned Hand, stating that the proportionate ap-
proach achieves a more equitable result.
There is, however, a statutory obstacle to the use of the propor-
tionate approach. While Internal Revenue Code section 2039(b) (an-
nuities) and section 2040 (joint interests) specifically authorize the use
of a proportion in determining the value of these interests, no such
authorization is written into section 2043. Since the weight of consid-
ered opinion in these days of spiraling inflation lies on the side of the
proportionate approach. Congress should amend section 2043 to specif-
ically authorize the use of a proportion in determining the value of
interests transferred for less than adequate consideration.7 5
70. 347 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1965).
71. Id. at 17.
72. See Freeland, Lind & Stephens, supra note 24.
73. See Lowndes, Consideration and the Federal Estate and Gilt Taxes, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 50 (1966).
74. Morrison, supra note 61, at 236-44.
75. California Revenue and Taxation Code section 13641 has adopted the propor-
tionate method when a transfer is for less than full and adequate consideration. The
property to be brought back into the decedent's estate is determined by the following
formula:
Consideration received
Property valued when transferred
at date of - X Transferred property
death Value of property at date of death
transferred at date of transfer
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Suggestions for Increasing the Consideration
Received by the Widow
Measured Widow's Election
Because of the courts' tendency to take the frozen dollar approach,
Miller and Martin advocate a measured widow's election. 76 The sale
is structured so that the property the widow transfers is equal to the
consideration she receives. This eliminates the problem of allocation
of subsequent appreciation since the transfer is for full and adequate
consideration making section 2036(a) inoperative. Thus, for ex-
ample:
Figure D
$500,000 $300,000 $200,000
W > Trust A: W for life - Children
(62 years
of age)
$835,000 $500,000 $335,000
H's Estate > Trust B: W for life - ) Children
$500,000 $200,000 $300,000
W > Trust A: W for life ) Children
(74 years
of age)
$1,250,000 $500,000 $750,000
H's Estate > Trust B: W for life ) Children
In both of the above examples there will be no inclusion of the corpus
of Trust A in the widow's estate because the life estate she received was
equal to the fee interest she transferred. It is readily apparent that the
older the widow is, the larger the Trust B corpus must be in order to
produce sufficient income to achieve a measured widow's election.
Invasion of Trust B
In order to increase the consideration the widow receives for her
transfer to Trust A, Brown and Brown suggest that the widow be given
a noncumulative right to invade the principle of Trust B to the extent
of 5,000 or 5 percent per year, whichever is greater.77 The lapse
of such a right will not cause inclusion in the widow's gross estate be-
cause it is excepted from inclusion by section 2041(b)(2). This right
can be valued actuarially and will increase the consideration the widow
has received. So, for example, where the widow is seventy-seven years
76. Miller & Martin, supra note 24, at 79-91.
77. Brown & Brown, supra note 56, at 357.
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of age and has the right to demand $5,000 per year from Trust B, she
receives an additional $29,422.50 in consideration for her transfer to
Trust A. 78 The increase of the consideration received by the widow
has the side effect of decreasing her purchase price and therefore de-
creasing the amount of income the widow can amortize from Trust B.
Effect on the Unified Credit
As has been mentioned earlier, Congress has replaced the lifetime
gift exemption and dual tax rate structure with the unified credit.79
Thus, except to the extent that the tax credit may have been used to
reduce gift tax liability for the remainder transferred to Trust A, it is
available to the widow's estate on her subsequent death. In the ex-
ample illustrated in Figure A, there has been a gift to the remainder-
men of a future interest valued at $100,000 with the resulting use of
$23,800 of the credit.
Effect of the Widow's Election on the
Marital Deduction
If the decedent's will has been drafted to provide for both a mari-
tal deduction and a widow's election, the marital deduction will be
denied to the extent that the widow is required to relinquish her prop-
erty in order to take under the will. 80 In United States v. Stapj, 1 a
decedent left property to his wife that qualified for the marital deduc-
tion, but the bequest was conditioned on the transfer of the wife's prop-
erty to a trust. The Court held that the marital deduction was to be
decreased by the value of the property the widow was required to relin-
quish.
To avoid the Stapf result, the husband's will can be written so as
not to require the widow to put her property in Trust A. This will
give the husband's estate the benefit of the marital deduction but will
destroy the bargained-for exchange and hence will destroy the widow's
election itself. In addition, the widow will be taxed on her gift of the
remainder interest of Trust A. To avoid the gift tax, the widow can
place her assets in a revocable trust or in an irrevocable trust over which
she retains a general power of appointment. This eliminates the gift
78. 26 C.F.R. § 198 (1976).
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001, 2010.
80. Id. at § 2056(b)(4).
81. 375 U.S. 118 (1963).
1452 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28
to the remaindermen but again destroys the bargained-for exchange
and hence the widow's election.
The marital deduction and the widow's election, however, are not
incompatible; a will can be drawn to take advantage of both. The hus-
band must transfer a qualifying interest to his wife who is then put to
an election whereby she can transfer this property to Trust A in ex-
change for a life estate in Trust B.82 Thus, for example, a husband
with an adjusted gross estate of $500,000 must transfer $250,000 out-
right to his wife, thereby qualifying for a $250,000 marital deduction.
The widow is then offered the choice of keeping the $250,000 and tak-
ing nothing more by way of her husband's will or placing the $250,,000
in Trust A in exchange for a life estate in the $250,000 corpus of Trust
B.
Effect of the 1975 Revision of the California
Probate Code on the Widow's Election
Before July 1, 1975, all community property in the husband's
control was subject to administration in his estate.8 3 This had the effect
of placing all the community property before the probate court. Once
the court had jurisdiction of both halves of the community property, it
was an easy matter to implement the widow's election. The decree of
distribution by the probate court would place both halves of the com-
munity property in trusts and would set forth the terms of administra-
tion of the trusts.
Effective July 1, 1975, the wife's community property is not
subject to administration in her husband's estate.84 This presents a
problem in implementing the widow's election since the probate court
no longer has the widow's property before it. There are two statutory
solutions to the problem: Probate Code sections 202(b) and 202(c).
Section 202(b) provides that the widow may elect to reinstate the
system in effect before July 1, 1975, if the election is made within four
months of the issuance of letters testamentary. Such an election con-
fers jurisdiction on the court to order distribution in accordance with
the terms of the decedent's will. The advantages to a section 202(b)
82. A qualifying interest is a nonterminable property interest that passes from the
decedent to his spouse and is includable in the decedent's gross estate. A nonterminable
interest does not end on the spouse's death and is, hence, includable in her estate. A life
estate is an example of a terminable interest; a fee interest is nonterminable.
83. 1931 Cal. Stats., ch. 281, § 202, at 596.
84. CAL. PROB. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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election are multiple:85 (1) the community property is kept intact
throughout the administration of the estate. This is particularly desir-
able where the community assets are business interests that are not
easily divisible; (2) the expense and inconvenience of dividing the
estate is eliminated (e.g., dividing stock, only to put it together again
in Trust A and Trust B); (3) the liability imposed on the widow by
Probate Code section 205(a) for the deceased husband's debts is elimi-
nated. When the widow's community property is not subject to admin-
istration she remains personally liable for the debts of her husband that
are chargeable against the community property; (4) the probate court
is the sole forum for dealing with creditors' claims; (5) the widow can
have her interest in community real property distributed to her even
though her husband held sole title. When the widow's community
property is not subject to administration, she would have to petition the
superior court in order to have her interest confirmed to her under Pro-
bate Code section 650. The disadvantage of a section 202(b) election
is that executor's commissions and attorneys' fees will be calculated on
the entire value of the community property subject to administration
rather than on the husband's half alone.
Section 202(c) provides that the widow may elect and agree to
have her community property transferred to a trustee named under her
husband's will or to a trustee of an existing trust identified by her hus-
band's will. This election and agreement must be filed before the
entry of the decree of final distribution. An implication of this section
is that the probate court may establish Trust A without any res and ap-
point a trustee pending the receipt of the widow's community property.
A problem inherent in this procedure is accounting for the widow's
community property interest from the date of her husband's death to
the date of her transfer to Trust A. Kahn and Frimmer suggest two
potential solutions.8" A schedule of the widow's community property
with receipts and disbursements since the date of the husband's death
can be filed at the time Trust A is funded, or the husband's will can
provide that the trustee may accept the widow's statement that the
property she transferred to Trust A represents all her community
property.
The advantages to the use of section 202(c) are twofold. First,
no executor's commissions or attorneys' fees are paid on the wife's com-
85. Kahn & Frimmer, California Probate of Community Property: The Final
Picture Emerges, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 260, 263 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kahn &
Frimmerl.
86. Kahn & Frimmer, supra note 85, at 263.
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munity property. Second, the postponement of filing the election and
agreement until the entry of the final decree causes the income earned
on the community property during administration to be taxed one-half
to the widow and one-half to the husband's estate.8 7 Income splitting
is not available once the widow's election is irrevocably made, and sec-
tion 202(b) requires such election to be made within four months of
issuance of letters testamentary.
As has been shown, the choice between sections 202(b) and
202(c) is dictated by diverse factors which are best evaluated after the
husband's death. It is therefore suggested that the husband's will be
drawn flexibly to permit the selection of either section 202(b) or
section 202(c).88
Alternatives to the Widow's Election
The widow's election has been seen to produce gain to the seller
of the life estate, to saddle the widow with gift tax liability, and to actu-
ally increase the widow's estate. Thus, it is not surprising that a num-
ber of writers have become disenchanted with the widow's election.
They suggest a modification of the Trust A - Trust B arrangement to
provide the widow with financial security while at the same time de-
creasing her gross estate.
Brawerman suggests a plan whereby the husband bequeaths all
the community property in trust, the widow receiving income from
Trust A while the income from Trust B is accumulated.89 If the
widow's income is insufficient, the corpus of Trust A will be invaded.
Only when the corpus of Trust A is exhausted will the widow receive
distributions from Trust B. At the widow's death she has a general
power of appointment over Trust A and a limited power of appointment
over Trust B. When the widow elects to take under her husband's will,
she does not purchase a life estate in Trust B. Therefore, there is no
income to the seller of the life estate. Of course, the widow cannot
amortize the income she receives from Trust B, but she is not getting
this income until Trust A is exhausted. Furthermore, the widow does
not make a taxable gift to the remaindermen of Trust A since she re-
tains a general power of appointment over that property.
Brawerman's plan is a viable alternative for the moderately-sized
estate wherein the widow may need to invade the corpus of Trust A
87. See notes 48, 49 supra.
88. See Appendix A.
89. Brawerman, Disposition of Community Property: Should One Spouse Re-
ceive a Life Estate in Other's Half?, 40 J. TAxATXOm 116, 117 (1974).
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and may want the security of a backup trust. There is no advantage
in using Brawerman's plan if the estate is large, because the widow will
never deplete Trust A and will never need Trust B. In addition, there
may be a substantial throwback problem if the Trust B beneficiaries
are in a high income bracket since the income from Trust B is accumu-
lated. 0
Professor Lane suggests the establishment of an annuity trust
(Trust A) and an accumulation trust (Trust B).11 The characteristics
of these trusts are quite similar to those proposed by Brawerman. The
only difference is that Lane's Trust A would pay the widow all its in-
come plus an amount of the corpus equivalent to the income earned
by Trust B. This will insure the depletion of Trust A.
Both Lane's and Brawerman's plans avoid the tax problems arising
from the sale of a life estate acquired from a decedent. The plans do
not, however, provide the widow's estate with a tax savings because on
her death the income she has received and not spent will be included
in her estate under section 2033.
Plan Suggested for Use with the 1976
Tax Reform Act
The passage of the 1976 Tax Reform Act marked the end of many
estate and gift tax loopholes. Two small ones remain which an estate
planner can use in place of the widow's election.
Section 2503 (b) has been left intact, permitting tax-free gifts of
present interests in the amount of $3,000 per year per donee. Section
2035(b)(2) has been added by the 1976 act so as to assure that such
$3,000 gifts will never be drawn back into the estate by the contempla-
tion of death presumption. In a hypothetical situation, where a hus-
band and wife have two children and four grandchildren, each spouse
can transfer $18,000 per year without making a taxable gift. This
saves $6,120 in taxes per $18,000 gift in a $500,000 estate.
The second loophole that remains is the grandchild exception to
the new tax on generation-skipping transfers. Section 2613(b)(6)
permits $250,000 to pass through each child to the grandchildren with-
out taxing the transfer on the child's death.92 Thus, in our Figure A
hypothetical, the husband and wife can each fund a $500,000 trust, in-
90. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 666.
91. Lane, supra note 25, at 135.
92. It should be noted, however, that the interest passing through each child is
valued at the time of the child's death.
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come to the two children for life and remainder to the grandchildren.
Approximately half of each trust will escape the generation-skipping
transfer tax.
A combination of the two above tax advantages suggests the
following estate plan as applied to our facts: The husband and wife
make gifts in January of each year that qualify for the section
2503(b) exclusion. The husband's will creates a trust providing for
the discretionary disbursement of income to the widow for life, then in-
come to the children for life, remainder to the grandchildren. Income
is distributed to the widow only if she has depleted her own estate.
This permits the widow to reduce her estate, secure in the knowledge
that she will always be adequately provided for. The widow continues
to make section 2503(b) gifts in order to deplete her estate. On the
widow's death, she can pour over her remaining assets into the trust
already set up under her husband's will.
Assuming the husband lives for five years after the enactment of
this plan, the widow survives him for five years, and there is a 7 percent
yield on their capital, the total estate tax on their million will be
$125,800. The total money received by the children and grand-
children will be $990,330, of which $500,000 will pass to the grand-
children without further tax.93 This is in sharp contrast to the estate
tax of $217,600 that would be due without any estate plan9 4 and the
$263,990 in taxes that would be due utilizing the widow's election.95
The tax saving is made without any gift or income tax liability, whereas
the widow's election has been shown to be fraught with potential gift
and income tax liabilities.
Conclusion
One of the primary purposes of the widow's election is to save
taxes. The tax saving reputedly occurs on the widow's subsequent
death when her gross estate is decreased by the consideration received
for her transfer to Trust A. The courts have consistently treated the
consideration received as the life estate in Trust B" rather than the
life estates in Trust A and Trust B. Since the income the widow has
received from Trusts A and B is included in her gross -estate under sec-
93. See Appendix B.
94. See Appendix C.
95. See Appendix D.
96. United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332, 343 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Past, 347 F.2d 7, 13 (9th Cir. 1965); Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 688,
690 (5th Cir. 1962).
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tion 2033, her gross estate is augmented by the widow's election, rather
than depleted. In addition, the seller of the life estate will realize an
immediate gain, probably capital, to the extent the fair market value
exceeds the carryover basis of the remainder the widow transfers to
Trust A.
Another major purpose of the widow's election is to provide the
widow with economic security and peace of mind. This is accom-
plished by providing her with income from Trusts A and B for life, with
invasion of the corpus of Trust A and then Trust B if necessary. The
same security can be provided by the alternative estate plan suggested
by this article. Such a plan provides that before the widow receives
income from her husband's trust, she must deplete her own estate. It
is suggested that such depletion be accomplished by nontaxable $3,000
yearly gifts. This plan has the advantage of providing the widow with
the security of a backup generation-skipping trust without the concom-
mitant tax problems inherent in the widow's election.
THE WIDOW'S ELECTION
Appendix A
Will Clauses To Implement Probate Code Section 202
1. Introductory declaration: To provide for the widow's use of either section 202
(b) or section 202(c) of the California Probate Code, Kahn and Frimmer suggest the
use of an introductory statement to the widow's election will: 97
I request that my wife elect to have her half of our community property ad-
ministered by my Trustee hereinafter named and I further request that such
intent be implemented either by conveyance to such Trustee by my wife or
by my wife's election to subject such property to administration in my estate.
If she shall fail to comply with this request in the manner provided by law
then the provisions of this Will shall be carried out in all respects as if she
had predeceased me.
2. Introduction to residuary trust (also suggested by Kahn and Frimmer):98
If my wife shall elect to have her half of our community property governed
by this Will, such property shall constitute a separate trust, hereinafter referred
to as "Trust A."
3. Alternative gift: To provide for disposition of the decedent's property in the
event the widow elects to take against the will:
If my wife declines to transfer her half of the community property to the
Trustee then the provisions of Paragraph - shall be carried into effect as if
she predeceased me.
4. Executor's authority: The executor must be permitted to accept the property
from the widow if she proceeds under California Probate Code section 202(b):
I authorize my executor to accept as part of my probate estate my wife's one-
half interest in our community property should she elect to take under my
will.
5. Trustee's power: The trustee must have the power to accept the property from
the widow if she proceeds under section 202(c):
The Trustee may accept my wife's one-half interest in our community property.
6. Pecuniary bequest: To insure against the failure of Trust A for lack of a res,
the decedent should fund the trust with one dollar:
I give one dollar ($1) to Trust A should my wife survive me, and if she does
not survive me the gift shall lapse and become part of my residuary estate.
97. Kahn & Frimmer, supra note 85, at 264 n.13.
98. Id.
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Appendix B
Estate Plan as Outlined in this Article
Husband Wife
Corpus $500,000 $500,000
Five years of
tax free gifts of
$18,000 (90,000) (90,000)
Estate tax on
$410,000 estate 125,200
Unified credit (47,000)
Estate tax (78,200)
Corpus producing
income for widow 331,800 410,000
Yearly income
after husband's
death (7%) 23,226 28,700
(to be accumulated) (all used for
widow's living
expenses)
Five more years of
tax free gifts by
widow (90,000)
Corpus on widow's
death 447,930 320,000
Estate tax on
widow's estate 94,600
Unified credit (47,000)
Estate tax 47,600
TOTAL TAXES 125,800
Total money going to children and grandchildren
before imposing generation skipping tax:
Gifts $90,000
90,000
90,000
$270,000
Husband's trust 447,930
Wife's trust 272,400
TOTAL $990,330
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Appendix C
No Estate Plan
Husband's estate tax
on $500,000 estate $155,800
Unified credit (47,000)
$108,800
Wife's estate tax
on $500,000 estate $155,800
Unified credit (47,000)
$108,800
TOTAL TAXES $217,600
Appendix D
Widow's Election
Husband's estate tax liability on
$500,000 estate $155,800
Unified credit (47,000)
Husband's estate tax $108,800
Gift tax liability on widow's
$100,000 gift to remaindermen 23,800
Unified credit (23,800)
Gift tax 0
Income tax on $100,000 capital gain
on sale of life estate to widow
(assuming estate has no other income
and is, therefore, in the lowest
bracket) 22,590
Widow's estate tax liability on
$500,000 estate [($500,000-$200,000)
+ income from $500,000 = $500,000] 155,800
Remaining unified credit (23,200)
Widow's estate tax 132,600
TOTAL TAXES $263,990
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